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Commitment Controls
Prepared by Dimitar Radev and Pokar Khemani 
The three major objectives of a public ﬁ  nancial management system (PFM) are: (1) ﬁ  scal discipline 
(expenditure control); (2) allocation of resources consistent with policy priorities (strategic 
allocation of resources); and, (3) prudent management of the government’s ﬁ  nancial resources 
(economy, efﬁ  ciency, and effectiveness). These three objectives—together with the need for 
transparency and accountability in ﬁ  scal relations—are complementary and interdependent, 
though in many developing countries ﬁ  scal discipline, in many ways, is of paramount importance, 
and any efforts at addressing the other two objectives come next. 
Expenditure control is an essential element of ﬁ  scal discipline. For control purposes, the literature 
distinguishes four main phases of the expenditure cycle: (i) authorization or allocation of 
appropriations to spending agencies; (ii) commitment—incurring a future obligation to pay; 
(iii) veriﬁ  cation—the acquisition and veriﬁ  cation of goods and services; and (iv) payments. There 
are speciﬁ  c forms of control during the different stages of the budget execution process. The 
current paper focuses on expenditure control at the commitment stage. 
The focus on commitment controls is justiﬁ  ed on the grounds of their important role in 
developing an overall expenditure control framework, as well as controlling the accumulation of 
TECHNICAL NOTES AND MANUALS
This note1 addresses the following main issues:
What are the objectives of commitment controls? ￿ 
What are the preconditions for successful implementation of commitment controls?              ￿ 
What are the main institutional forms and operational arrangements of commitment controls? ￿ 
What are the implications for the IMF’s operational work and technical assistance? ￿ 
1 An earlier version of this note was previously issued as part of a series of technical notes on the IMF’s Public Finan-
cial Managment Blog (http://blog-pfm.imf.org). This note has beneﬁ  ted from peer review by B. Olden, G. Ljungman 
and H. van Eden, helpful comments from other FAD/IMF colleagues, including R. Allen, D. Bouley, I. Fainboim, M. 
Lazare, and M. Pessoa, as well as very valuable comments by M. Williams, IMF consultant.2  Technical Notes and Manuals 09/04  |  2009
payment arrears. Arrears have been an issue in a signiﬁ  cant number of Fund-supported programs.2 
The arrears typically arise from a breakdown of normal ﬁ  nancial controls and may undermine 
ﬁ  scal adjustment programs. 
The rest of this paper considers the following issues:
the deﬁ  nition and objectives of commitment controls; • 
preconditions for successful implementation of commitment controls;  • 
institutional design of commitment controls; and • 
implications for the IMF’s operational work and technical assistance. • 
Deﬁ  nition and Objectives of Commitment Controls I. 
Deﬁ  nition
Commitment means an obligation to make a future payment subject to the fulﬁ  llment of certain 
conditions (contractual or otherwise). There are two main types of commitments: (i) speciﬁ  c 
commitments; and (ii) continuing/running commitments.
Speciﬁ  c commitments are those that will require a single payment or a series of payments over 
a determinate period of time. These include contracts for goods and services, or any similar 
arrangement, and occur when a formal action is taken by a line ministry, such as placing an 
order for supply of goods and services, issuing a local purchase order, or awarding a contract 
to a supplier. 
Continuing commitments are those that will require a series of payments or settlement actions 
over an indeterminate period of time, and might not involve a speciﬁ  c contract. These include 
wages, utilities, scholarships, entitlement payments, and other similar arrangements. 
A standard approach to deﬁ  ning commitments by economic category of expenditure and cash 
requirements for payments is presented in Box 1. 
Objectives
The commitment of resources is a critical stage of the expenditure process. Controlling 
commitments is essential for controlling expenditure. The key objective of commitment control 
is to manage the initial incurrence of obligations, rather than the subsequent cash payments, 
in order to enforce expenditure ceilings and avoid expenditure arrears (see Box 2). To this end, 
the commitment control system imposes limits on commitments. These limits can be based on 
budget appropriations or on cash plans. Ideally, commitments should be regulated by annual 
budget appropriations. However, this approach may prove to be insufﬁ  cient in preventing the 
2  Nearly one-half of all countries with programs in effect during 1993–99 had a performance criteria (PC) on ar-
rears at some point during the period. Compliance with PCs on arrears has been lower than on the more traditional 
quantitative ﬁ  scal PCs.Technical Notes and Manuals 09/04  |  2009        3
Box 1. Commitment and Cash Requirements for Payments
Salaries, wages, and allowances. The need to pay salaries, wages, and allowances arises from 
an implicit or formal agreement between the employer and an employee, according to conditions 
laid down in various acts and regulations. At any point in time, the ministry of ﬁ  nance  (and each 
line ministry) should know, with a fair degree of accuracy, what the salary bill will be into the 
foreseeable future. Because of the stability, predictability, and regularity of these types of payment, 
the cash ﬂ  ow is often deemed to occur monthly at the same time as the line ministry’s monthly 
commitment (e.g., from a payroll management system).
Subsistence and travel payments. Commitments usually occur in this category when an 
approval is signed for travel to be undertaken by an ofﬁ  cer. From past records it should be 
possible to establish when travel normally occurs, when approvals are given, and when the 
invoices to be paid are received (i.e., how long after the commitment). Past records will show the 
normal time gaps between each phase—approval/commitment, actual travel, and cash payment.
Other recurrent expenditures. This category contains a variety of items, some where 
expenditures might be expected to occur simultaneously with the corresponding commitment; 
others where actual expenditures take place some time after the placing of a requisition or order. 
However, likely expenditures on most of the items are predictable, including post and telephone 
services, water, light, and sanitary changes, printing and stationery, etc. The key is to examine 
each line item and determine the amount and likely pattern of payment.
Grants/transfers. Commitments to pay grants and transfers will be known based on the program 
developed at the beginning of the year, inﬂ  uenced by law, regulation, and/or policy decisions by 
the government.
Financing. The proﬁ  le of debt services and loan receipts and repayments should be readily 
identiﬁ  able from the debt database or corresponding loan agreements.
Furniture, ﬁ  xtures, and minor capital equipment. Cash payments will normally occur 
considerably later than the commitment, which will generally occur when a local purchase order or 
other form of contact is awarded.
Capital projects. This category is probably the most difﬁ  cult to forecast in terms of both 
commitments and the associated cash payments. However, most projects are the result of 
contracts placed, so payment details should (broadly) be known when the contract is signed. The 
commitment can be for a long period of time (probably more than one year) and expenditure ﬂ  ows 
tend to be “lumpy.” Delays can occur in construction and delivery, so updated forecasts on the 
progress of work and requirement of funds are regularly needed for these projects. 4  Technical Notes and Manuals 09/04  |  2009
incurrence of arrears in the case of overall revenue shortfalls. Commitment controls based on 
expenditure ceilings or cash limits reconcile the availability of resources with commitments, thus 
ensuring that spending units are able to enter into contracts, or other obligations, only if sufﬁ  cient 
unencumbered balances are available, or likely to be available at the time of their payments. It 
is necessary that expenditure ceilings should be guided by a well functioning cash management 
system.
Preconditions for Successful Implementation of Commitment  II. 
Controls
The introduction of effective commitment controls requires a comprehensive approach to 
strengthening PFM systems. The most important improvements are required in the budget 
formulation and budget execution processes. A realistic budget is a key precondition for efﬁ  cient 
budget execution, including commitment controls. Similarly, commitment controls need to be 
supported by a good cash planning system for setting credible expenditure ceilings. The essential 
preconditions for successful implementation of commitment controls are summarized in Box 3 
and brieﬂ  y described below.
Box 2. Payment Arrears—Deﬁ  nition and Reasons
Arrears can be deﬁ  ned as outstanding payment obligations that the government has failed to 
discharge in a reasonable period of time. They can arise on any expenditure item, including 
wages, debt service payments, transfers, and expenditure on goods and services. Arrears may 
occur for any of a number of different reasons, including:
Poor budget preparation: ￿   Unrealistic budgets overstate revenue and ﬁ  nancing so that there 
is insufﬁ  cient funding to carry out planned expenditures. Line ministries may thus commit 
expenditure within budget appropriations, even though there is no cash to discharge all such 
commitments.
Poor budget execution:  ￿  Problems in this area include poor monitoring and control of 
expenditures which do not adequately constrain government purchases and which allow 
purchases outside formal procedures to go undetected, and cash allocations that do not match 
resources approved by the budget.
Poor budget discipline: ￿   Expenditures of certain ministries may be difﬁ  cult to control by the 
central ministry of ﬁ  nance (MoF) because of a lack of sanctions against those responsible for 
breach of compliance with budget regulations.
Lack of political commitment to agreed ﬁ  nancial policies:  ￿  The authorities may deliberately 
circumvent the impact on real government spending of ﬁ  nancial constraints by recourse to 
unorthodox sources of ﬁ  nancing, notably arrears.Technical Notes and Manuals 09/04  |  2009        5
Political commitment to the reform process plays a central role. If commitment to the reform 
process is weak, the chances of success are limited. A major problem for many public sector 
reforms is that they are introduced in an organization without the willingness to accept the 
reforms, the technical ability to implement them, or the ability to maintain them once introduced. 
As a result, the reforms do not succeed or are badly delayed, create distortions that have damaging 
effects, and, in many cases, are eventually abandoned. Therefore, the decision to introduce 
expenditure control measures needs to be accompanied by a strong political commitment to the 
overall reform process that will generate internal support, adequate resources, and an effective 
change management agenda.
An effective system of control over commitments needs to be supported by a sound regulatory 
framework, including a Budget System Law (BSL) and ﬁ  nancial regulations. In addition to the 
general legal framework for commitment controls, the BSL should provide clear rules on virements/
reappropriations between the executive and legislature on various broad expenditure categories 
and distribution of virements powers within the executive—between the ministry of ﬁ  nance (MoF) 
and line ministries. The executive should have power to withhold budget provision and release of 
funds in the prescribed conditions. The ﬁ  nancial regulations need to set down a detailed system for 
controlling all types of commitment and preventing accumulation of payment arrears. 
The regulatory framework and the PFM procedures should provide enough safeguards so that 
there can be no deliberate override of controls by any bureaucratic or political authority. When 
controls are deliberately overridden, opportunities for the diversion of funds into activities not 
approved by the budget are encouraged. This diversion, by reducing the funds available for 
legitimate requirements, contributes to arrears. It also encourages spending agencies to view 
arrears as an option for funding legitimate activities. The regulations need to prescribe a set of 
sanctions and penalties for noncompliance and ﬁ  nancial misconduct in such circumstances.
The credibility of the budget predetermines the quality and the effectiveness of commitment 
controls. A key indicator for the credibility of the budget is the level of deviation between the 
approved and the actual budget. In many developing and transition countries, the deviations 
between approved budgets and actual budget outturns are signiﬁ  cant. An analysis of budget 
allocations compared with real spending (actual payments plus arrears) usually shows that 
some ﬁ  xed-cost items, such as utilities, rents, and other unavoidable expenditures (e.g., food for 
Box 3. Preconditions for Successful Implementation of Commitment Controls
Strong political commitment and accountability; ￿ 
Sound regulatory framework; ￿ 
Realistic budget and adequate budget coverage; ￿ 
Effective cash planning and management; and ￿ 
Well-established accounting and reporting systems. ￿ 6  Technical Notes and Manuals 09/04  |  2009
prisoners), are often underfunded in the budget. Thus, unrealistic budget projections undermine 
the process of budget execution, and speciﬁ  cally, the soundness of cash planning, which is the 
basis for controlling commitments. Therefore, an effective system of commitment controls requires 
a well-formulated budget with realistic expenditure provisions, guided by sound expenditure 
policies and priorities. 
The lack of a good cash planning and management system, or low quality of cash plans, place 
practical limitations on the effectiveness of commitment controls. A principal task of commitment 
controls is to ensure that commitments are only entered when consistent with the budget, and, 
ideally, with quarterly expenditure ceilings. The principal task of cash planning is to ensure that 
the quarterly ceilings are consistent with the projected cash availability, which enables them to be 
used as ceilings for approving commitments. Cash planning on its own will be ineffective unless it 
is integrated with control over commitments. 
Effective commitment controls require a good accounting and reporting system. The ideal 
situation would be when the accounting and reporting system is organized on an accrual basis, 
because commitments are formally accounted for in such a system. However, this is not the 
case in developing countries that apply cash-based recording and reporting. The cash-based 
systems require additional records with respect to commitments.3 In many developing countries, 
the requirement to control commitments is reﬂ  ected in the structure of records that should be 
maintained by budget institutions (typically, in a column in a basic vote book or commitment 
and expenditure ledger). These ledgers are typically prepared manually and are poorly 
maintained. At the same time, statutory requirements focus almost exclusively on controlling 
expenditures with respect to budget appropriations. Accountability to parliament is achieved 
through annual appropriations that expire at the end of each ﬁ  nancial year, and ﬁ  nancial reports 
reﬂ  ect cash execution of the expenditure plans approved by parliament
A functioning internal and external audit system is also sometimes considered as a precondition 
for introducing commitment controls. Indeed, an effective system of internal audit is useful 
for evaluating and improving the effectiveness of internal control processes and management, 
including the commitment control system. Similarly, external audit can play a useful role in 
identifying systemic weaknesses in control mechanisms, and suggesting solutions. However, it 
may be unrealistic to expect that a developing country would have a well functioning internal 
and external audit system. Almost certainly, the controls will be introduced ﬁ  rst and the audit 
procedures later. 
3  This paper does not discuss the different recording and reporting bases. For more detail, see International Mon-
etary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001.Technical Notes and Manuals 09/04  |  2009        7
Institutional Design and Operational Arrangements  III. 
Institutional design and operational arrangements for commitment controls4 vary from one 
country to another. However, the many varieties of commitment control arrangements can be 
broadly classiﬁ  ed in two main categories: centralized and decentralized. Centralized commitment 
controls are performed by a central agency, usually the MoF or treasury. Decentralized 
commitment controls are performed by respective line ministries and spending agencies. The most 
common arrangements for both systems are described below.
Centralized Commitment Controls—MoF/Treasury
The line ministry would initially send to the treasury a commitment request on a quarterly  • 
basis (broken down according to the budget classiﬁ  cation) for continuing commitments (e.g., 
wages, utilities, scholarships, discretionary allowances, entitlement payments). A commitment 
request for speciﬁ  c commitments (related to expenditures that require a speciﬁ  c contract or 
order), would be prepared and sent to the treasury before an order for goods and services is 
placed, or a commitment is incurred in any form. 
The commitment requests would be examined by the treasury to ensure that the new monetary  • 
value does not exceed the uncommitted budget allocation balance and the authorized cash 
disbursement proﬁ  le for the line ministry. Once the availability of funds has been veriﬁ  ed, 
the commitment request would be formally approved and recorded by the treasury. No such 
contract or purchase order would be legally valid until so approved. The treasury would register 
both the expenditure ceilings/cash disbursement proﬁ  le and the approved commitment requests.
Payments would be made only after veriﬁ  cation by the treasury that the payment was against an  • 
approved commitment. The treasury should discharge the commitment after the payment has 
been made. 
The treasury information system and the records in the line ministries, as appropriate, should  • 
be modiﬁ  ed to reﬂ  ect budget allocations, commitments, cash disbursement proﬁ  les, available 
uncommitted balances, payments, outstanding commitments, and unpaid bills in a distinct 
manner. 
The treasury should prepare quarterly and monthly in-year budget execution reports that can  • 
be directly compared with the budget allocation of expenditures at both the commitment and 
payment stage.
4  There are signiﬁ  cant differences in the systems of commitment control between countries from different legal, 
institutional, and administrative backgrounds, for example between “Anglophone” and “Francophone” systems 
(though these categories are themselves an oversimpliﬁ  cation of reality since there are wide differences of practice 
between countries from both of these two traditions). These variations in systems and procedures reﬂ  ect signiﬁ  cant 
differences in the stages and processes of budget execution. The present note focuses primarily on the system of 
control in countries from the Anglophone tradition. 8  Technical Notes and Manuals 09/04  |  2009
Decentralized Commitment Controls—Spending Agencies
Each ministry should have a commitment control ofﬁ  cer (CCO). The head of a ministry/ • 
department should act personally or through an authorized person as a CCO and be 
responsible for managing commitment controls. 
All expenditure transactions should be processed through the commitment control system.  • 
The starting point should be for each ministry to prepare a quarterly expenditure plan in a  • 
format prescribed by the MoF . This plan, supported by projected monthly cash requirements, 
should reach the cash management unit in the MoF by a speciﬁ  c day of the month preceding 
each quarter. 
Based on its annual and three-month rolling cash plan, the MoF would issue quarterly  • 
expenditure ceilings broken down by broad categories of expenditure. 
In the event that the quarterly expenditure ceiling is less than the quarterly expenditure  • 
plan submitted by a ministry, the plan should be adjusted to match the level of the quarterly 
expenditure ceiling. The CCO needs to ensure that commitments entered into are consistent 
with the quarterly expenditure ceiling—without incurring any payment arrears. 
No commitment could be entered into if it exceeds the uncommitted balance available  • 
under the relevant budget item and subitem. It is also necessary that the prescribed internal 
controls—such as administrative and ﬁ  nancial authorizations—are complied with. 
Such a strict requirement is practicable for the recurrent budget—but not for capital investment  • 
or development projects, where contracts and commitment may extend for six or 12 months. 
For that reason, a separate six-month expenditure ceiling could be provided for development 
projects: again CCOs would be required to approve any commitment entered into and satisfy 
themselves that it is consistent with the prescribed ceilings. 
The authorization of commitments is a particularly important control in such systems.  • 
Accordingly, the head of a line ministry should designate only speciﬁ  c ofﬁ  cers to authorize the 
purchase of goods and services, and, to sign and issue a local purchase order. Thus, before any 
order for goods and services can be placed, or a commitment is otherwise incurred, a clearance 
needs to be sought from the relevant authorizing ofﬁ  cer. A commitment requisition form could 
be used for initiating a commitment.
Centralized vs. Decentralized System of Commitment Controls
If the basic PFM systems and control procedures are weak and the organizational arrangements 
are fragmented, with limited skills and capacity, as in the case of many developing countries, 
building a centralized system is likely to be the more appropriate and cost-effective way to control 
expenditure commitments. On the other hand, when basic PFM systems are well established 
and supported by modern technologies, decentralized commitment controls could be a viable 
alternative. However, the overall process of decentralizing controls and payment processing 
requires a number of supporting measures, including: (i) strengthening internal controls, Technical Notes and Manuals 09/04  |  2009        9
accounting, and reporting procedures; (ii) training accountants and establishing local accounting 
ofﬁ  ces within line ministries; (iii) centralizing cash balances; and (iv) developing a sound reporting 
system with strengthened accountability and transparency.
In practice, the speciﬁ  c arrangements for commitment controls should be guided by the overall 
organization of the budget execution process, especially with respect to payment and accounting 
arrangements. A number of countries have moved away from the traditional centralized treasury 
systems for the execution of the budget as the banking system became more efﬁ  cient. As a result, 
the spending agencies were given enhanced powers to control budget implementation, but were 
held accountable to meet speciﬁ  c performance criteria. 
In developing countries, in general, budget execution systems—including internal controls, 
payment systems, and accounting—need continuous improvement to enhance efﬁ  ciency 
and effectiveness in the utilization of resources and delivery of public services. Against this 
background, current centralized payment systems need to evolve toward involving spending 
agencies and acquiring more ﬂ  exibility; and current decentralized systems must better 
accommodate needs for monitoring, accounting, cash management, and comprehensive audits. 
However, the centralization of cash balances, central control of the government’s bank accounts 
and a sound reporting system are ideally required in both systems.
Speciﬁ  c Operational Arrangements
Multiyear commitments5 impose additional responsibilities. Such commitments should be 
incurred only after obtaining the formal approval of the MoF . The spending agencies should 
be required to submit to the MoF full details of multiyear contracts including the anticipated 
commitments and payments for each year, which can then be included in the medium-term 
budget framework. At the annual budget formulation stage, the MoF needs to make full provision 
for annual commitments and include them in annual and quarterly cash plans. During the budget 
implementation phase, project managers must keep each project under constant review and report 
to the budget ofﬁ  ce and treasury any changes in the appropriations and cash plans.
The level of ﬁ  xed commitments in budget estimates can play a substantial role for the 
organization of commitment controls. Although the practices vary from country to country, most 
PFM systems categorize expenditures in terms of priority. The highest priority expenditures are 
usually considered ﬁ  xed commitments that cannot be reduced from their appropriated level. These 
usually include debt payments and payments of salaries and pensions, but some countries extend 
the list of priority items to cover poverty-reducing spending and other signiﬁ  cant parts of the 
5  Multiyear commitments do not include such commitments where a ministry has placed an order in year 1 but re-
ceives goods in year 2. The treatment of outstanding commitments at the end of a year and multiyear commitments 
should be very much guided by the accounting basis and policies followed by a country.10  Technical Notes and Manuals 09/04  |  2009
budget.6 The excessive use of ﬁ  xed commitments usually has a negative impact on the coverage 
and effectiveness of commitment controls. 
A computerized Financial Management Information System (FMIS) can substantially improve 
the operations of a commitment control system. The FMIS functionality should include a well 
designed commitment control system. Further, the FMIS needs to require an accurate and timely 
recording of all commitments and expenditures by the treasury and spending agencies, without 
which it can not serve as an effective tool of expenditure control. The experience of some countries 
in this area suggests that arrears continue to be built up even with the introduction of a FMIS, 
primarily due to agencies’ failure to process all commitment transactions through the system. 
Implications for IMF Policy and Technical Assistance IV. 
In the context of program and surveillance work and technical assistance, the IMF is especially 
concerned about ﬁ  scal discipline and the accumulation of expenditure arrears in low-income 
countries. Among other things, the accumulation of arrears is a clear indication of the lack of 
proper commitment controls. Therefore, the introduction or strengthening of such controls should 
be considered, in the context of both program and technical assistance work, as a key measure in 
such circumstances. 
Although the introduction of commitment controls is necessary, it is not sufﬁ  cient to prevent the 
incurrence or further accumulation of arrears. The development of a commitment control system 
needs to be supported by concomitant measures in other PFM areas, as described in Section III, 
particularly with respect to improving the budget formulation process and the overall credibility of 
the budget, and strengthening cash planning and management.
Technical assistance should especially focus on the design of the commitment control system, and 
its operational arrangements. The choice of a centralized or decentralized model should be guided 
by the overall design of the PFM system. As noted, for most developing countries, the centralized 
model should be the preferable option, because of the generally underdeveloped PFM systems and 
limited administrative capacity in these countries. However, any concrete recommendations about 
the institutional design of a commitment control system will require the exercise of judgment, 
based on the speciﬁ  c country circumstances. When the basic PFM system is well established (a 
much rarer case in developing countries), the decentralized model of commitment controls could 
also be applied.
6 The  ﬁ  xed commitments covered over 90 percent of the budget of Georgia in 2003, while arrears increased to 5 
percent of GDP.Technical Notes and Manuals 09/04  |  2009        11
Regardless of the concrete institutional design of a commitment control system, technical 
assistance should ensure that it meets the following basic operational requirements: 
A commitment should be incurred only when it is within the budget appropriations and the  • 
expenditure ceilings/cash releases approved by the MoF .
No payment should be made unless it is based on an approved commitment. • 
Outstanding commitments and unpaid bills should be monitored on a regular (preferably  • 
monthly) basis.7
Payment arrears should not be allowed to accumulate and, if they do, they should be cleared as  • 
a matter of priority. 
Conclusion V. 
There are four main lessons emerging from the above discussion: 
First, the decision to introduce expenditure control measures, including commitment controls, 
needs to be accompanied by strong political commitment to the reform process, strengthened 
credibility of the budget, and the development of an institutional framework that does not allow 
deliberate override of controls. 
Second, the introduction of expenditure controls, including commitment controls, should be 
regarded as a component of a wider PFM reform process. Reforms that improve cash planning and 
management, as well as accounting, recording and reporting, are particularly important.
Third, a commitment control system should be properly designed in order to achieve its intended 
goals. Although the centralized model is a recommended option for developing countries, the 
decentralized model could also be applied in certain circumstances, particularly when the basic 
PFM system is well established.
Fourth, the introduction or strengthening of commitment controls, as a component of a broad 
PFM reform process, is key to addressing the problem of expenditure arrears, in the context of the 
IMF’s operational work and technical assistance. 
7  A distinction needs to be made between “outstanding commitments” and “unpaid bills.” Unpaid bills are those 
where goods and services have been provided, and bills are overdue for payment. A proper accounting system using 
the concept of accounts payable would clearly reﬂ  ect the extent of outstanding unpaid bills. Alternately, it is neces-
sary to separate arrears from outstanding commitments.12  Technical Notes and Manuals 09/04  |  2009
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